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Abstract 
We develop a diagrammatic framework that can be used to study the economic linkages 
between regions or cities.  Hitherto, such linkages have not been the primary focus of either 
the theoretical or empirical literatures.  We show that our general framework can be used to 
interpret both the New Economic Geography and Urban Systems literatures to help us 
understand spatial economic linkages.  We then extend the theoretical framework to allow us 
to consider a number of additional issues which may be particularly important for analyzing 
the impact of policy.  Such policy analysis will also require empirical work to identify the 
nature of key relationships.  In a final section, we consider what the existing empirical 
literature can tell us about these relationships. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
While the primary impact of an economic change may be focused in a particular city or 
region, its effects may also be felt in other regions.  There are interdependencies across 
places so that what happens in one region has implications not only for this location but 
for other regions as well.  The objectives of this paper are to investigate these linkages, 
identifying the channels through which these effects operate and their net impact. The 
issue is important because, as we will see, under some circumstances changes that 
benefit one region also have positive effects on other areas.  When this complementary 
relationship between regions holds, the impact of a shock is in some sense shared 
between regions. Under other circumstances, however, regions are in a competitive 
rather than a complementary relationship with one another.  A positive shock to one 
region has a negative impact elsewhere, with the result that the benefit to the first region 
is amplified at the expense of other regions. 
Understanding the circumstances under which these alternatives occur is crucial 
for understanding regional inequalities, and for evaluating the effects of policy.  
Consider two examples. A policy measure raises productivity and hence wages in one 
city or region.  Do the induced changes increase wages in other regions also, or are 
spatial differences in wages amplified?  Does expanding the housing stock in a region 
with high house prices necessarily reduce the price of houses in that region, or can it 
give rise to population movements that will further amplify housing price differences 
between locations?  The answers to these questions turn on whether regions are in a 
complementary or competing relationship with each other. 
 Our technique for investigating these issues and establishing the relationship 
between regions is primarily diagrammatic.  We develop a framework that shows how 
two regions in an economy interact, and illustrates how there can be equilibrium spatial 
disparities.  We use the framework to analyse the effect of a change in one region on 
another and to show how – depending on a few key elasticities – equilibrium adjustment 
may dampen or amplify shocks. 
 Our diagrammatic approach is ‘reduced form’, summarising the micro-economic 
detail of a wide range of economic models in a few elasticities.  This approach has, we 
hope, the benefits of being relatively accessible and independent of the details of 
particular modelling approaches.  However, it is important that the reduced form 
relationships are linked to models in the literature.  The later sections of the paper relate 
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these elasticities to both the theoretical and empirical literatures in economic geography, 
regional economics, and urban systems. 
 
2.   Linkages: a Diagrammatic Approach. 
The main objective of the paper is to develop an analytical framework that can be used 
to understand the equilibrium of a multi-region economy and establish the comparative 
static effects of ‘shocks’ to one of the regions.  The text develops the argument 
diagrammatically for a two region economy, while a parallel algebraic analysis for a 
multi-region economy is presented in the appendix.  We shall refer to the two regions, 
or cities, as N and S.  The total labour force in the economy is fixed at level L, but it can 
be divided between the two regions with LN + LS = L.   We focus on three key ‘reduced 
form’ relationships which can be captured in a four quadrant diagram.  
 
Earnings-employment (EE):  The first relationship we refer to as the earnings-
employment relationship and it determines the wage that is paid to workers in a region 
as a function of the labour force in the region. Denoting wage rates in N and S by wN 
and wS , we assume that the earnings-employment relationship can be written as: 
  
w
SSS Law
η= ,           (1) wNNN Law η=
 
where aN and aS are productivity parameters, and wη is the (common) elasticity of 
earnings with respect to employment.1  The shape of this relationship depends on 
technology and market interactions. For example, if product and labour markets are 
perfectly competitive and there are diminishing returns to labour then the function gives 
the marginal value product of labour, and wη  ≤  0.2   If there are increasing returns 
(internal or external to firms) then it is possible that wη  >  0, and we discuss the forces 
that shape the relationship in this case in section 5.   
The earnings-employment relationship is illustrated in the top left quadrant of 
figure 1 by curve EE.  Because we are interested in the linkages between regions the 
figure is constructed in terms of the relative values of the endogenous variables in each 
                                                 
1 For expositional purposes, we assume that the earnings-employment relationship is iso-elastic allowing 
us to draw our four quadrant diagram in terms of ratios of key endogenous variables. 
2  If the production function is Cobb-Douglas and other factors are fixed then wη  is equal to the labour 
share minus one. 
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region.  Thus, the horizontal axis of the top-left quadrant is relative employment, LS /LN, 
and the vertical is relative wages, wS /wN .  That is: 
 
EE:  ( )( ) wNSNSNS LLaaww η/// =      (2) 
 
The interpretation of the curve is straightforward.  Given a division of the labour force 
between the two regions, LS /LN,  the curve shows the associated relative wage wS /wN .  
The case illustrated is one with diminishing marginal returns to labour, wη  < 0, so that 
an expansion of relative employment in S leads to a fall in the relative wage in S.  We 
will look at the case where wη  > 0 in section 3. 
 
Cost of living (HH): High relative earnings in a region should encourage migration into 
that region, but migration in turn has implications for the cost of living.  There are 
several mechanisms through which population can affect the cost of living, the most 
direct of which is through the fact that workers consume space. Increasing the labour 
force in a region bids up the prices of houses (and residential land) and so raises the cost 
of living. This relationship is steeper the less elastic is housing supply (due to planning 
regulations for example) and the greater is the share of housing in the cost of living 
index.  Other factors may enter this relationship, including goods prices and commuting 
costs, and these are discussed further in section 5.   
We denote the cost of living in each region by hS , hN  and assume, for the 
moment, that it is a function only of the labour force in the region. Thus,  
 
( hSSS bLh η/= ) ,      ( ) hNNN bLh η/=     (3) 
 
where, once again, bS and bN  are shift parameters and hη  is the elasticity of the cost of 
living with respect to the labour force. The shift parameters, bS and  bN , can be 
interpreted as exogenous factors controlling the supply of land, so an equiproportional 
increase in bS and LS  has no effect on the cost of living in S.  
For the purposes of diagrammatic exposition we again use the relative values:  
 
HH:  ( ) ( ) hh NSNSNS LLbbhh ηη /// −=     (4) 
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 This relationship is illustrated in the bottom right quadrant of figure 1, drawn with 
0>hη , so that greater population is associated with higher cost of living. 
 
Migration (MM):  We assume that workers are potentially mobile between regions and 
that they move in response to real wage differences between regions.  Long run 
equilibrium occurs therefore when real wages, adjusted by any amenity values, are 
equalised across regions. Since real wages are nominal wages divided by the cost of 
living index, the migration equilibrium schedule is determined by the condition, 
 
MM:  or equivalently NNNSSS hwchwc // = ( )( )SNNSNS cchhww /// = , (5) 
 
where cS and  cN  are shift parameters that reflect, for example, amenities in the two 
regions.  If cS = cN  then this migration equilibrium schedule is simply the 45% line as 
illustrated by the line MM in the top right hand quadrant of figure 1.  Above the line 
workers in S are better off than those in N , so there is a tendency for migration from N 
to S, and conversely below the line. 
With three economic relationships for three pairs of endogenous variables (the 
labour force in each region, wages and costs of living) the fourth quadrant is 
conceptually redundant, and the line LL is simply the 45o line, matching values of LS /LN 
across quadrants. 
 
3.   Equilibrium. 
 
Together, these relationships determine the equilibrium distribution of workers between 
regions and the associated levels of earnings and costs of living.  The full equilibrium of 
this system occurs when values of LS /LN, wS /wN , and hS /hN  are consistent with all 
relationships holding simultaneously. If the two regions are symmetric (aS /aN  = bS /bN  
= cS /cN  = 1) then the relative values of all endogenous variables are unity at the 
equilibrium. Before applying the framework we need to spend some time outlining how 
equilibrium is attained, and distinguishing between three different cases – distinctions 
that will be crucial when we come to comparative static analysis. 
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3.1  Complementary regions: 
Figure 1 illustrates the case of ‘complementary regions’.  The equilibrium is shown by 
the points indicated by circles and joined by the dashed lines.   
To understand how one identifies the equilibrium, it is helpful to consider the 
following thought experiment. Suppose that the initial situation is one in which 
employment in S is relatively high, as at point A on the LL curve. Tracing up to the EE 
curve gives the value of relative wages corresponding to relative employment at A. 
Similarly, tracing over to the HH curve gives the relative cost of living.  Looking at the 
MM quadrant, we see that these levels of relative wages and living costs correspond to 
the point A’ which is below the MM curve, meaning that real wages in N are above 
those in S.   As we move point A along the LL line in the bottom left quadrant, relative 
wages and relative living costs change, tracing out the dashed curve ZZ in the top right 
quadrant. Thus the ZZ curve traces out combinations of relative wages and relative 
living costs, given the employment-earnings and cost of living relationships.   
 Now, recall that the MM curve gives the combinations of relative wages and 
relative living costs at which real incomes in the two regions are equal.  Thus, the 
equilibrium must be at the intersection of MM and this derived curve ZZ.  At this point 
relative wages and living costs are consistent with the division of the labour force 
between regions, and there is no incentive for workers to migrate from one region to the 
other. 
Notice that this equilibrium is stable, in the sense that labour migration is an 
equilibrating force.  To see this, once again consider starting at labour allocation A. 
Workers in S have a lower level of real income than workers in N (point A’). As a result, 
workers migrate from S to N moving the economy along the LL line in the direction of 
the arrow.  As LS /LN  declines,  wS /wN  increases (the EE relationship) and  hS /hN  falls 
(the HH relationship), moving along ZZ in the direction of the arrow until the 
equilibrium is reached.     
For reasons that will become clear when we turn to comparative statics, we 
define the configuration illustrated in figure 1 as the ‘complementary case’.  The aspect 
of the configuration that matters for comparative statics is that the ZZ curve is 
downwards sloping. The ZZ relationship is easily derived from the EE and HH curves 
as: 
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ZZ:  ( )( ) ( ) hww NSNSNSNS hhbbaaww ηηη ///// =      (6) 
 
This schedule is downward sloping as long as 0/ <hw ηη ; if 0>hη , then this obviously 
requires a negative elasticity of earnings with respect to employment,  0<wη . 
 
3.2   Competing regions: 
The case illustrated in figure 1 assumes that there are diminishing marginal returns to 
labour ( 0<wη ), so that along the EE curve higher levels of employment are associated 
with lower wages.  But at the heart of much of the literature on urban systems and new 
economic geography is the idea that this relationship may be positive as a consequence 
of increasing, rather than diminishing, returns to activity in an area.  The mechanisms 
underlying this are discussed in more detail in section 5, but for now we simply 
consider the implications of this for the equilibrium.  The EE curve is now positively-
sloped as shown in figure 2, and so higher relative employment in S also implies higher 
relative wages.  The change in the slope of the EE curve affects the slope of ZZ schedule 
and this has major implications for the comparative static properties of the model as we 
shall see in section 4.  It is the positive slope of the ZZ schedule that defines this case as 
‘competing regions’, and in terms of underlying elasticities this occurs when 
0/ >hw ηη ; if 0>hη , then this obviously requires a positive elasticity of earnings with 
respect to employment, 0>wη . 
Although the slope of the ZZ curve has reversed, the equilibrium illustrated in 
figure 2 is still stable.  Relatively high values of LS /LN  map into points on ZZ below the 
MM line, meaning that real incomes in S are low relative to those in N and so there is 
migration from S to N which moves LS /LN  towards its equilibrium value.  This stability 
comes about because the slope of ZZ is less than that of MM, and for this we require 
that the elasticities satisfy 0>> wh ηη .  That is, as the labour force in a region 
increases, the cost of living needs to rise proportionately faster than earnings. Again, for 
reasons that will become clear when we turn to comparative statics, we refer to this 
situation as the “competing case”. 
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3.3 Divergent regions: 
The symmetric equilibrium of this model is unstable if increasing returns in the 
earnings-employment relationship are sufficiently strong, relative to the increasing costs 
in the cost of living relationship.  This case is illustrated in figure 3. The EE curve is as 
in figure 2 but the cost of living curve, HH, is drawn differently.  For the moment, focus 
only on the area around the symmetric equilibrium and note that the cost of living now 
responds less sharply to population changes.  This in turn produces a ZZ schedule which 
is steeper than the MM curve, and as a result the symmetric equilibrium is unstable.  In 
this case, if LS /LN  is relatively high then ZZ lies above MM; real incomes in S are above 
those in N and migration from N to S increases LS /LN  further.  This situation results 
when the underlying parameters are such that 1/ >hw ηη . 
 If the equilibrium is unstable, what happens?  There may be no other 
intersection of the MM and ZZ curves in which case one of the regions empties out, with 
LS /LN   going to zero or infinity.  Alternatively, it may be the case that as population 
levels in the two regions become very unequal, the cost-of-living becomes more 
responsive to further changes in population, resulting in a ‘bendy shaped’  HH curve, as 
shown in figure 3.3   This shape transfers to the ZZ curve, and implies that there are two 
asymmetric equilibria, in addition to the symmetric equilibrium already discussed.  
These are both stable (ZZ is less steep than MM at the point of intersection) and 
‘competing’ (ZZ has positive gradient, as in figure 2).  Thus, regions with similar 
underlying characteristics may be observed to have quite different population levels, 
wages and living costs. 
 
4.   Regional Linkages. 
 
We now turn to investigating the comparative static properties of the model.  To do this 
we assume that one region (S) is affected by some exogenous ‘shock’, and then see how 
inter-regional economic adjustment restores the equilibrium of the economy.  For 
obvious reasons we only look at changes to a stable equilibrium, and we commence 
with a shock that shifts the EE relationship, i.e. a productivity shock. 
 
                                                 
3 This requires that the elasticity of the HH curve varies. 
 7
4.1 Productivity shock: 
Suppose that region S experiences a positive productivity shock, which can be thought 
of as an infrastructure investment or some other supply side improvement. The direct 
effect of the shock is to shift the EE schedule upwards, as illustrated by the vertical 
arrows in figure 4a (for the case where the regions are complementary) and figure 4b 
(competing regions).  This shows that at given employment levels, the earnings of 
labour in S are increased.  This upwards shift in EE shifts the ZZ schedule upwards by 
an identical amount4, and the new (long-run) equilibrium is at the intersection of this 
new ZZ schedule and the MM line (illustrated by the outer rectangle of dashed lines in 
figures 4a and 4b)   Qualitatively, the effects of the positive shock to productivity are as 
expected.  There is an increase in wages in both regions and an increase in relative 
wages in S, wS /wN.  There is migration to S, and hence an increase in relative population 
and employment in S, LS /LN.  This in turn leads to an increase in the relative cost of 
living in S, hS/hN, offsetting the change in relative wages.   
How does the shape of each of the relationships EE and HH affect the nature of 
the linkages between areas?  For the complementary case illustrated in figure 4a, the 
relative wage change is smaller than the initial productivity shock, as can be seen by 
comparing the magnitude of the shifts in EE and ZZ with the associated wage change.  
This is the complementary relationship: a beneficial shock in S first increases wages in 
S, but then interregional migration draws labour into S from N, and as it does so wages 
in S fall and wages in N rise, partially offsetting the initial effect of the shock.  At the 
same time, these population movements produce changes in relative costs of living with 
house prices in S increasing while those in N decline, offsetting the change in relative 
wages.  Overall, the beneficial shock in S produces higher real wages in both regions, 
with higher employment and house prices in S, but an absolute fall in employment and 
house prices in N.   The magnitude of the changes depends on the elasticities of the 
relationships.  For example, if housing supply is very price inelastic then the HH curve 
is flat, and small changes in relative population cause large changes in relative living 
costs.  In this case, the shock is associated with small changes in relative populations, 
LS/LN , and relatively large changes (and consequent differences) in both wages and 
living costs.  Conversely, very price elastic house supply means that the shock causes 
large movements in population and small long run differences in costs of living and 
                                                 
4  This assumes that the productivity shock does not have any direct effect on the cost of living. 
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wages.  In the limit with HH and hence ZZ vertical, relative costs of living are 
unchanged and population movement brings wages back to equality.   
How are things different in the case of competing regions?  It is helpful to think 
first about the borderline case, in which the EE schedule is horizontal. Relative wages 
do not depend on employment levels, so the change in relative wages must be equal to 
the productivity shock.  All adjustment occurs through population movement and its 
consequent effects on living costs.  If the EE relationship is positively-sloped then we 
move from the complementary case of figure 4a to the competing region case of figure 
4b.  The productivity shock draws labour to S from N as before, but now this migration 
causes further increases in earnings in S, while decreasing earnings in N.  The price 
changes are therefore relatively large, and in particular the wage changes are amplified.  
Wages in S rise by more than the initial productivity shock, while wages in N decline as 
labour emigrates. Correspondingly large changes in relative population and in the cost 
of living are necessary therefore in order to equate real wages and restore equilibrium.   
Algebraic expressions for all these effects are given in the appendix, and are 
summarised in Table 1.  The productivity shock is of magnitude  (^ denotes a 
proportional change).  If 
Saˆ
0w <η  (complementary regions, figure 1 and 4a) then there is 
a less than proportional increase in wages in S (i.e. ) and wages in N rise.  But 
if  
SS wa ˆˆ >
0w >η  (competing regions, figures 2 and 4b) then migration amplifies (rather than 
moderates) the effect in S, giving a larger than proportional wage increase in S and wage 
reduction in N,   In both cases the cost of living (and house prices) in 
S increase while they fall in N, the magnitude of these effects being greater the larger is 
NSS waw ˆ0ˆˆ >>>
wη .  The change in the relative living costs in the two regions, , is less than the 
productivity shock if regions are complementary, but greater than the productivity 
shock if regions are competing. 
NS hh ˆˆ −
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 Table 1:  Equilibrium responses to an increase in productivity in south  
0ˆ >Sa , implying population movement . NS LL ˆ0ˆ >>
 Proportionate change in 
wages: . NS ww ˆ,ˆ
Proportionate change in 
cost of living: . NS hh ˆ,ˆ
Complementary: 
wh ηη >> 0  0ˆˆˆ >>> NSS wwa  
0ˆˆˆ >−> NSS hha
0ˆ    ,0ˆ <> NS hh  
Constant returns: 
wh ηη => 0  0ˆˆˆ =>= NSS wwa  
0ˆˆˆ >−= NSS hha  
0ˆ    ,0ˆ <> NS hh  
Competing: 
0>> wh ηη  NSS waw ˆ0ˆˆ >>>  
0ˆˆˆ >>− SNS ahh  
0ˆ    ,0ˆ <> NS hh  
Stability requires wh η>  η
 
 
4.2  Land supply shock: 
As a second experiment, we consider the effect of a shock that enables S to have a 
higher population with unchanged cost of living.  Perhaps the best example of this is a 
change in land use regulations that allows S to expand the stock of land available for 
housing.  The effect is to shift the HH curve left or downwards (a lower cost of living 
for the same size labour force), this translating into a similar size shift to the left of the 
ZZ curve.   
The effects for complementary regions are illustrated in figure 5a, and the new 
equilibrium is at the points on the dashed rectangle lying to the “south-west” of the old 
equilibrium.  The effects can be traced out as follows.  With given population, the shock 
leads to a fall in house prices in S, reducing living costs and raising real wages. This 
leads to migration to S from N, and with diminishing returns to labour, wages fall in S 
and increase in N.  The net result (once real wages are equalised by migration) is lower 
house prices and lower cost of living in both regions, with the house price decline 
greater in S than in N, to compensate for the lower wages in S (row 1, table 2). 
If regions are competing then results change radically.  With an upwards sloping 
EE curve (figure 5b) the shift establishes the new equilibrium on the outer rectangle of 
dashed lines.  As before, the initial fall in house prices in S leads to in-migration, but 
this now raises earnings in S and reduces them in N, widening the gap in real wages. 
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This attracts further inflows of labour, and the process is equilibrated only when the 
relative cost of living in S has increased sufficiently, as shown in the figure.  Increasing 
the stock of housing in S must therefore increase the relative cost of living in S, hS /hN .  
If the EE schedule is sufficiently steep, the new equilibrium requires that absolute house 
prices in S  increase in response to the construction of more houses!  This arises if 
Khw /ηη > , where K is the number of regions (so K = 2 in the diagrammatic analysis.  
This is a condition that is quite consistent with stability of equilibrium. The full listing 
of possibilities is given in table 2.   
 
Table 2:  Equilibrium responses to an increase in land in south. 
Sbˆ > 0, implying population movement . NS LL ˆ0ˆ >>
 Proportionate change in 
wages: . NS ww ˆ,ˆ
Proportionate change in 
cost of living: . NS hh ˆ,ˆ
Complementary: 
wh ηη >> 0  0ˆ <Sw ,  0ˆ >Nw 0 >  SN hh ˆˆ >
Constant returns: 
wh ηη => 0  0ˆˆ == NS ww  0 >  SN hh
ˆˆ =
Competing: 
0>> wh ηη  0ˆ >Sw , 0ˆ <Nw  0 >  NS hh ˆˆ >
Competing: 
02/ >>> hwh ηηη  0ˆ >Sw , 0ˆ <Nw  NS hh ˆ0ˆ >>  
Stability requires wh η>  η
 
 These two examples illustrate the importance of understanding whether regions 
are complementary or competing, and show how qualitative, as well as quantitative 
effects of policy change depend on the elasticities of some key relationships.  Similar 
analyses can be conducted for other parameter changes – such as amenity changes – or 
for combined packages of policy change.  Rather than undertaking more of these 
exercises, we now turn to the mechanisms underlying our reduced form relationships. 
 
5.   The Earnings – Employment Relationship  
 
The analysis presented above is based on reduced form relationships.  In the remainder 
of the paper we go behind these relationships, outlining the mechanisms that underpin 
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them and linking these to the existing literature, theoretical and empirical.   We start, in 
this section, with the EE schedule which, as we have seen, is crucial in determining 
whether regions are complementary, competing or divergent.   
A standard perfectly competitive model of production implies that additional 
employment in a region either reduces earnings or leaves them unchanged, 0≤wη . This 
is because, with non-increasing returns to scale, perfect competition, and some 
regionally fixed factor (call it capital), adding labour to a region increases the labour-
capital ratio, thereby reducing the marginal product of labour.  If capital were mobile or 
additional labour could be employed by changing the sectoral structure of production 
while holding labour-capital ratios in each sector constant (as in Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
theory) then earnings would be independent of employment, 0=wη .5   
Once we move outside the standard competitive framework it is possible that 
increased employment may be associated with higher wages, and the literature focuses 
on three basic mechanisms -- a classification that fits with that of Marshall (1890). The 
first is a market failure in the product market, modelled in the ‘new economic 
geography’ literature as an interaction between firm-level returns to scale and transport 
costs (section 5.1).  The second is market failure in input markets, particularly the 
labour market (section 5.2), and the third is a range of technological externalities 
(section 5.3).   
 
5.1 New economic geography: 
At the heart of ‘new economic geography’ models is a trade-off between two features.  
First, production within firms exhibits increasing returns to scale, implying that each 
firm wants to concentrate its production in one location, not spread it between many.  
Second, there are trade costs in shipping goods, implying that firms gain from 
producing close to their markets.  The combined effect of these two features is that 
firms seek to locate in regions with good market access, and this will tend to bid up 
wages in these regions.  But good market access is itself a consequence of having a 
large population.  This provides the basis for a positive relationship between population 
and wages – i.e. an upward-sloping EE schedule. 
The formal modeling of this follows from Krugman (1991a).  The 
manufacturing sector contains firms that have increasing returns to scale and produce 
                                                 
5  Factor prices are invariant with respect to a region’s endowment, see Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) 
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differentiated products, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Product differentiation means 
that firms engage in intra-industry trade, with each firm supplying all regions, although 
the presence of transport costs means that firms’ sales are skewed towards their ‘home’ 
market.  The industry is monopolistically competitive, so the number of firms in each 
location is determined by a zero profit condition. 6  This condition is the key part of the 
EE relationship, and in the literature is sometimes referred to as the wage equation 
(Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999).  It implicitly defines the wage at which firms in 
each region make zero profits, and this wage is an increasing function of regional 
expenditure or market size.  Adding an income/ expenditure relationship which makes 
expenditure in each region an increasing function of employment, gives a positive 
relationship between employment and earnings, 0>wη  and makes regions competing 
rather than complementary. 
Krugman’s model is a fully specified general equilibrium model, from which it 
is possible to derive exact conditions under which the relationship between regions 
switches from being competing to being divergent, with clustering of manufacturing 
activity in one region.  This turns out to be more likely the greater is the proportion of 
economic activity that is mobile (e.g. non-agricultural activity) and the lower are 
transport costs.  One of the main points that Krugman sought to make was that 
economic integration – lowering transport costs – could trigger regional divergence. 
The Krugman model has been developed in many directions, and we note just 
two of them.  One is that the results are not dependent on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz 
model of product differentiation and monopolistic competition.  The fact that a large 
market is attractive to firms, so leading to higher equilibrium wages in the larger 
market, holds for other forms of competitive interaction between firms (Irmen and 
Thisse, 1998, Coombes and Lafourcade 2003). 
Another extension was to add intermediate goods (Venables 1996, Krugman and 
Venables 1995).  In the basic Krugman model proximity to a large market tends to raise 
profits (or, with free entry, wages).  The presence of intermediate goods means that 
market size depends not just on final consumers, but also on the presence of other firms 
who demand intermediate goods, and the effect of this is to amplify the value of being 
in an economically large region.  Furthermore, firms also save transport costs from 
locating close to their suppliers. These effects (sometimes referred to as forward and 
                                                 
6   The fundamental market failure in the model is increasing returns at the level of the firm, meaning that 
firms do not divide their production between all regions. 
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backward linkages) serve to create increasing returns within and between manufacturing 
sectors, so much so that agglomeration of manufacturing can occur even if labour is 
immobile.  The main point for current purposes is that the presence of intermediate 
goods amplifies the positive relationship between earnings and employment, so will 
tend to make wη  larger. 
 
5.2  Thick market effects: 
Large markets are often more efficient than small markets – an argument that applies in 
labour and capital markets as well as in product markets.  In equilibrium, these ‘thick 
market effects’ translate into a positive relationship between a region’s labour force and 
the wage rate.  A number of mechanisms have been explored in the literature.  One is 
matching; the larger the pool of workers that a firm can access the more likely it is to be 
able to find the exact skills that suits its needs (Helsley and Strange, 1990; Amiti and 
Pissarides, 2005).  Another is risk sharing; if firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks 
then a larger labour market exposes workers to less risk by increasing the probability of 
re-employment if they are made redundant (Krugman (1991b).  Perhaps the most 
important argument is that a large labour market increases the incentives for workers to 
undertake training.  In a small market, workers who acquire specialist skills may be 
‘held-up’ by monopsonistic employers, in which case there is no incentive for them to 
invest in skills.  The presence of a large number of potential employers removes this 
threat of opportunistic behaviour, and thereby increases the incentives for skill 
acquisition (Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud 2005).  
 
5.3 Knowledge spillovers and externalities: 
The third set of arguments underlying a positive EE relationship is something of a 
catch-all residual category.  Knowledge spillovers are easier between proximate firms 
than remote ones.  The mechanism may be labor mobility, face-to-face social contact 
between workers, or ability to observe the practices of other firms.  Such effects are 
particularly important in innovation intensive activities, and a large literature points to 
the resulting spatial concentration of innovative activities (e.g. Audretsch and Feldman 
2004).  Location specific knowledge spillovers also arise as firms learn about the 
characteristics of knowledge transmission (Glaeser 1999).  Much work (including 
Jacobs 1969) focuses on cities as centres of innovative activity.  These approaches are 
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surveyed in Duranton and Puga (2004) and their implications for urban systems 
analysed in Abdel-Rahman and Anas (2004).   
 Of course, high levels of population and employment create some negative 
externalities as well as positive ones, most obviously because of congestion.  The 
magnitude and balance between these effects is thus an empirical matter.  This is the 
issue to which we now turn.   
 
5.4  The EE relationship: The empirical evidence: 
Empirically, what do we know about the EE relationship?  That is, what can the data tell 
us about the relationship between the size of a city/region and the productivity of firms 
and hence the level of earnings within the locality? 
One approach to this problem is to estimate the production function directly with 
total factor productivity (the value of production for given inputs of labour and capital) 
modelled as a function of variables related to city/region size, for example 
population/employment density.   The unit of observation might be the firm, the city-
industry or the city.  Regardless, in general terms, this involves estimating a relationship 
of the form: 
 
Value of production = f (labour, skills, capital, density, diversity, specialisation, sector 
specific variables, city fixed effects, time dummies)  (7) 
 
Following this approach yields a number of findings. The net effect of density on total 
factor productivity is estimated to be positive (Rosenthal and Strange 2004, p. 2133). 
This observation confirms that cities exist because there are productivity advantages 
when economic agents are located together (agglomeration economies) that more than 
offset the congestion costs associated with higher densities.  That is, cities are not just 
about shared public goods and/or rent seeking.   Furthermore, cities are different sizes 
because the extent of agglomeration economies varies across different production 
activities (Rosenthal and Strange 2004, p. 2134). Some production activities 
(particularly in high-tech sectors) benefit from being in places where lots of similar 
activity is taking place (localisation economies) while others benefit from locating in a 
diverse environment (urbanisation economies) (Henderson 2003).  The largest cities 
tend to be diversified, while smaller cities are more specialised. (Duranton and Puga 
2000, 2001). 
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The major drawback of the ‘production function’ approach is that it is very 
demanding in terms of data.  Obtaining measures of capital stock at the city/region level 
is particularly problematic.  An alternative approach is to work directly with the 
relationship between wages and employment/population. In this case, the general form 
of the relationship is: 
 
Wage = f (labour, skills, density, diversity, specialisation, sector specific variables,   
   city fixed effects, time dummies)      (8) 
 
Comparing this to the specification in equation (7), the only differences are that the 
wage is the dependent variable and measures of capital stock are no longer included on 
the right-hand side.  This relationship has sound theoretical foundations providing the 
price of capital is the same in all cities/regions.    
Looking across this literature, there is strong evidence of a positive relationship 
between earnings and employment/population at the city/region level. Doubling 
population density increases wages by between 3 and 6%. For evidence relating to the 
US, see Ciccone and Hall (1995); for selected EU countries, see Ciccone (2002); for the 
UK, see Rice, Venables and Pattachini (2006); for France, see Combes, Duranton and 
Gobillon (2004).  There is some evidence of direct interaction across neighbouring 
locations.7  Ciccone identifies an additional effect of approximately 3% from the 
employment density of neighbouring regions. However, these effects appear to decline 
steeply with distance. In the case of the UK, for example, Rice et al (2006) find no 
evidence of effects between locations more than 80 minutes apart in terms of travel 
time.  Decreasing travel time or distance by 10% between regions results in predicted 
productivity gains of 1.14% and 0.24% in the UK and France, respectively. 
Analysis of relationships such as (7) and (8) requires that we control carefully 
for differences in the skill composition of the workforce across locations.   Evidence 
from Rice et al (2006) suggests that one third of UK regional inequalities in earnings 
can be explained by differences in skill composition.  For France, Combes et al (2004) 
suggest a somewhat larger effect, with around 50% of regional inequality explained by 
differences in skills, while urbanisation and localisation economies explain about 20%. 
Controlling for skill is inherently problematic because of sorting effects.  Formal 
                                                 
7   This direct interaction is in addition to the equilibrium interactions of our model. 
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measures of training or occupation only capture part of workers’ abilities, and if there is 
a positive correlation between the unmeasured part of ability and workers’ decisions to 
live in large urban areas, then  econometric work will tend to overstate the productivity 
effects of cities.  
The approaches reviewed above focus on the static aspects of agglomeration 
economies. There is another strand of literature on agglomeration economies concerned 
with the dynamics of urban growth. A simple specification to study the role of dynamic 
externalities can be derived by assuming local externalities affect the growth rate, rather 
than the level of productivity: i.e. 
 
Growth in the value of production between period t-s and period t = f (density at time t-
s, diversity at time t-s, specialisation at time t-s)  (9) 
 
This approach is often applied to long-run growth rates, that is with s quite large and 
allowing the effects to differ across sectors. Unfortunately, data on production by 
regions and sectors is scarce and rarely available at different points in time. For these 
reasons, many studies analyse the growth of employment instead of the growth in 
production (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Schleifer, 1992, Henderson, Kuncoro and 
Turner, 1995). More recent studies use time series econometrics to estimate full 
dynamic models of employment ( for example: Henderson, 1997; Combes, Magnac and 
Robin, 2004). 
 In summary, the existing evidence suggests that, at least for some range of city 
sizes, the EE relationship may well be upward sloping.8  A number of econometric 
difficulties remain to be fully resolved (e.g. endogeneity, the need to control for 
compositional characteristics) but the recent literature that has begun to address these 
issues still points to a positive relationship.  
 
6.  The Cost of Living and Migration 
 
While much of the research effort has focussed on the relationship between employment 
and earnings, our analytical discussion makes clear that the role of migration and the 
relationship between the cost-of-living and population size are also important in shaping 
                                                 
8 Au and Henderson (2004) provide evidence that productivity effects in China follow an inverted-U so 
that productivity (and hence wages) are only increasing over some range of city sizes. 
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economic linkages across space.  In this section we briefly review the evidence relating 
to these although, relative to work on the EE curve, the literature tends to be more 
eclectic in terms of methodology and applications. 
 
6.1 The cost-of-living and the HH relationship 
The cost-of-living depends on product prices, the price of land and housing, and 
additional costs such as commuting.  The original new economic geography models 
(Krugman 1991a and following) ignored housing, rents, and intra-regional transport, so 
the costs of living are determined only by the price of goods.  This tends to generate a 
negative HH relationship – regions with a large population have lower living costs – the 
opposite of the relationship illustrated in the preceding figures.  There are three related 
arguments for this.  The first is that a large region tends to have lower transport costs 
because a smaller proportion of goods are imported.  The second is that there is a wider 
range of products on offer (think of non-tradable goods such as restaurants) and, given 
that people like variety, these have the effect of bringing down the cost of producing 
utility (and hence the true cost of living index).  The third is that competition between 
firms is more intense in a dense area of activity, and this brings down prices for 
consumers.  
While these product market factors are important, empirically they often seem to 
be outweighed by considerations relating to land and housing, aspects that were crucial 
in earlier work on urban and regional economics.9  A positive HH relationship could be 
based on simply postulating an upwards-sloping supply of land for housing, so 
increasing population raises its price.  An alternative, on which much of the urban 
economics literature is based, supposes that the price of each marginal unit of land in 
the area is constant.  However, commuting costs within each city create a premium on 
city centre land.  Thus, in the simplest model, all employment takes place in the ‘central 
business district’ (CBD).  Urban land rents adjust so that, in equilibrium, all individuals 
are indifferent about where in the city they are housed and, since commuting costs 
increase with distance from the CBD, land rents must decline with distance.  What does 
this imply for the relationship between city size and cost of living, that is the HH 
schedule?  In the simplest case (a linear city, equal size residential lots and commuting 
                                                 
9   The first attempt to combine Krugman’s model with increasing land prices was Helpman (1998). 
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costs proportional to distance) the cost of urban living (rent plus commuting cost) 
increases with the square of population.  More generally, the cost is increasing and 
convex. 
This tradition of urban modelling provides an attractive way of endogenising 
land prices.  In many contexts, it is also important to look also at constraints imposed by 
planning systems and their implications for housing supply.  For example, the land use 
planning system in the UK determines the supply of land essentially independently of 
price. Since a central intention of this planning is to contain urban development by 
fixing growth boundaries, the supply of space is quasi-fixed. While it is possible to 
increase the density of occupation of a given land area, evidence suggest that this 
margin of flexibility has not been sufficient to prevent the elasticity of supply of 
housing from decreasing in the UK between the early and later parts of the 20th century 
as supply constraints became binding (Malpezzi and Maclennan, 2001). Recent 
estimates of the price elasticity of housing supply vary widely across countries.  For the 
UK,  Barker (2004) reports a range of estimates for the price elasticity of supply of new 
housing from about 0.3 to 1.0.  Swank, Kakes and Tiemen (2002) provide international 
comparisons of the price elasticity across countries, ranging from lows of 0.3 for the 
Netherlands and 0.5 for the UK to highs of 1.4 for the US and 2.1 for Germany.    
The response of house prices to population change depends not only on the 
elasticity of housing supply, but also the price elasticity of demand by households. 10  
However, all other things being equal, the effect of a low supply elasticity is to make 
the HH curve steeper, and this is an important factor both in the UK and elsewhere.  A 
number of studies of US regional housing markets have identified low supply elasticity 
of housing due to land use regulations as an important factor behind rapid housing price 
increases in a number of US metropolitan areas, most notably San Francisco, Boston 
and Los Angeles (Evenson , 2002; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2005). 
In summary, the systematic evidence that is available points to a relatively steep 
HH curve across a number of countries. A very limited amount of evidence also points 
to the fact that there can be quite substantial variation across regions within countries 
(see e.g. Meen, 2003). 
                                                 
10   A recent review by Meen and Andrew (1998) suggests that this demand elasticity is around 0.5.  
House prices may be more sensitive to changes in household incomes than to changes in number of 
households (see Cheshire, Marlee and Sheppard 1999).  
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.    
 
6.2  Migration and the MM relationship: 
The third key ingredient is migration.  How mobile is labour between regions?  
Answering this question is difficult, because it is quite possible that very high degrees 
of potential mobility coexist with low levels of actual mobility, precisely because 
housing prices are acting to equilibrate flows, making households indifferent between 
living in different regions. 
On average 1 percent of households migrate between major regions of the UK 
each year, with net outflows from London, the North East, North West and West 
Midlands and net inflows into the South East, South West and East (HM Treasury, 
2001).  The empirical evidence for the UK supports the contention that workers’ 
location decisions are responsive to real wage differentials.  A body of econometric 
evidence has built up showing that high relative wages significantly increase net 
migration into a region; while high relative house prices discourage it (see Murphy, 
Muellbauer and Cameron, 2006 for a recent review).  There is also evidence of a 
migration/commuting trade-off (Jackman and Savouri, 1996; Murphy, Muellbauer and 
Cameron, 2006).  For contiguous regions, where relatively cheap commuting offers an 
alternative to migration, the location decision tends to be more strongly influenced by 
housing price differentials and less influenced by wage differentials.  The reverse is true 
if commuting is more costly.  This suggests that migration in the UK will move the 
economy along the ZZ curve towards the intersection with the MM curve where real 
incomes are equalised.   
One important caveat is in order, however. Within these average mobility rates 
there are large variations in migration rates between skill groups, with higher skill 
groups displaying a significantly higher propensity to move between locations than their 
lower skilled counterparts. A number of possible explanations have been offered for this 
difference. The costs of migration – particularly those associated with transacting in the 
housing market – may be relatively greater for lower skilled workers (Hughes and 
McCormick, 2000).  Lower skilled workers tend to rely more heavily on local informal 
networks of contacts for information regarding the job market.  Finally, the external 
benefits associated with ‘thick’ labour markets produce clustering of high skilled jobs. 
Workers sort by location whereby more able workers group themselves in particular 
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locations where there are the largest economic returns. In particular contexts, we may 
want to allow for these differences in mobility across different groups. 
 
7.   Conclusion 
 
We have argued that three relationships play a key role in determining the economic 
linkages between cities.  The first concerns the link between local employment and 
earnings, the second the link between local employment and the cost of living and the 
third the migration response to differences in real wages between locations.  These three 
relationships provide the basis for a graphical framework for analysing the linkages 
between cities or regions. We can use this framework to draw out the implications of 
existing theoretical models for the linkages between cities, even though these models 
are not explicitly concerned with these linkages. Perhaps more importantly for policy 
purposes, this graphical framework allows us to consider when gains in one city or 
region spillover positively or negatively to other areas.   
The simple reduced framework set out in sections 3 and 4 highlights the 
importance of the nature of the relationship between employment and earnings in 
determining the direction of spillovers between cities/regions.  If the relationship 
between employment and earnings is negative then complementarity applies, so that a 
positive productivity shock to one city creates positive spillovers to other cities as 
economic adjustment dampens and disperses the impact of shocks.  This outcome is 
reversed if the relationship between employment and earnings is positive as a result of 
agglomeration economies.  In these circumstances cities or regions are in a competitive 
relationship, and the process of adjustment to shocks tends to amplify the gains to one 
area.  If workers are perfectly mobile then migration flows ensure that these changes in 
nominal earnings do not translate in to differences in real earnings (because the cost of 
living adjusts to offset the earnings differential).  If this is not the case, workers in the 
other cities can see their real standard of living decline. 
Given their importance, what do we know about the nature of the three key 
relationships?  A priori theoretical reasoning cannot help us choose between the 
different possibilities and we must turn instead to empirical evidence. We have 
reviewed the evidence on all three relationships, with a particular focus on the earnings-
employment relationship where, arguably, our degree of ignorance is greatest.  We 
reach a number of conclusions.  First, the nature of the housing market in the UK means 
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that the cost of living increases quickly with rising employment.  Second, and consistent 
with our theoretical framework, this cost of living effect implies small migration flows 
between cities, even though the evidence suggests that many workers are quite mobile 
and respond to real earnings differentials between places.  It is likely that commuting 
between cities partially substitutes for the migration that would occur in the absence of 
cost of living effects.  Third, the employment-earnings relationship may be upward 
sloping opening up the possibility for negative spillovers across cities, but this 
relationship is almost certainly sector and location specific.   
This specificity makes it hard to reach general conclusions about magnitudes, 
but does allow us to generalise about the direction of changes induced by the linkages 
between regions.  Specifically, the positive employment relationship, at least for some 
ranges of city sizes points to the possibility of a competing relationship.  As we have 
seen this means that an initial positive shock to, say, productivity in one region will get 
magnified as workers migrate from other regions.  However, as workers migrate, living 
costs are driven up.  Where housing supply is relatively inelastic, as in the UK, this may 
be associated with quite small movements in population.   
Do the resulting changes in employment, wages and cost of living matter?  For 
mobile workers the answer is almost certainly not. Willingness to migrate ensures that 
real wages are equalized independent of location choice. In the UK, at least, this 
suggests that differences in wages and house prices are not a major issue for young 
skilled graduates who are highly mobile.  For lower skilled workers and others who, for 
one reason or another, may be immobile, the effects are more complicated.  In the 
expanding region, these workers may see increases in housing costs outweighing 
increases in wages if agglomeration effects are larger for skilled than unskilled (which 
empirically may be the case).  In contracting regions the opposite effect may occur.  
These differences will also play out differently depending on the pattern of home 
ownership with implications for wealth as house prices change.  Clearly, further work is 
needed, but our theoretical model, coupled with the limited empirical evidence at least 
provides a starting point for thinking about these issues. 
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Theoretical appendix 
There are K regions, and region i has labour forces Li, with ΣiLi  = L.  Wage rates are wi 
costs of living are hi.  The earnings employment relationship is 
  
( ) w
iiiii
LaLwaw η== ,            (A1) 
 
where wη  is the elasticity of earnings with respect to employment. The cost of living 
relationship is  
 
( ) ( ) hiiiii bLbLhh η// == ,            (A2) 
 
We think of this principally in terms of the housing market, so an increase in bi 
represents an increase in region i housing stock. The functions have elasticity hη .  The 
migration relationship is 
 
jjjiii hwchwc // = ,   for all pairs of locations, i, j,    (A3) 
 
where ci is a shift parameter, and an increase would represent an increase in the amenity 
value of living in region i.  
 
Using A1 and A2 in A3 equilibrium values of Li satisfy,  
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Now consider a shock to a particular region, S.  Changes in employment across all 
regions sum to unity, and if we assume that all regions are initially symmetric this 
condition implies 
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where  is the change in each region other than S.  Now differentiating A4 and using 
A5 we derive: 
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The effects of various shocks on other endogenous variables are given by using (A6) in 
(A1) – (A3): 
 
Productivity shock in S:  Saˆ
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Increase amenity in S:  Scˆ
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